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*Chincom*  
*April 1953*  
*Background*

I. SUMMARY OF EXISTING COCOM/CHINCOM SHIPPING CONTROL MEASURES

A. Ship Sales

1. Control over Sales to European Soviet Bloc

a. The following vessels are embargoed (reference List of War Material and IL/II)

- Group B, Para. 2      Vessels of war of all categories. Special landing craft. Equipment for submarine minesweeping.
- Para. 4      Specifically military elements of the equipment enumerated in Paras. 1, 2, and 3 above.
- Para. 5      Material intended for the military equipment of vehicles, vessels or aircraft not included in Paras. 1, 2, and 3.
- 1410      Floating docks
- 1405      Ice-breakers (i.e., ships constructed specifically for the purpose of breaking ice), of 2000 h.p. or over.
- 1410      Tankers, tank barges, whaling factories
- 1415      Warships (whether or not converted to non-military use and regardless of current state of repair or operating condition; and hulls, or parts of hulls, for such ships.

b. The following vessels are subject to quantitative control (IL/II)

- 2401      Dredges
- 2405      Ice-breakers (i.e., ships constructed for the purpose of breaking ice) under 2000 total h.p.
- 2415      Other vessels, as follows (and hulls or parts of hulls therefor):

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(a) Merchant vessels having (1) a gross registered tonnage over 7000 tons, independent of speed, or (2) on operating speed loaded or over 12 knots.

(b) Fishing vessels as follows:

(1) of 100 feet in length or over; or

(2) having apparatus for generating electrical power of 20 KW or over.

(c) Merchant vessels, n.e.s.

(d) Other vessels, n.e.s., over 40 feet (12m) in length or over 50 shaft h.p. (or equivalent)

c. COCOM policy on exports of International List II vessels

Exports to the European Soviet bloc of all vessels on List II are subject to the following procedure (COCOM Document 470, paragraph 3d):

"Where the latest available information does not permit agreement on reasonably accurate and defensible quantitative limits, from a security viewpoint, the items will be controlled with full regard to their strategic importance, as revealed by discussion in COCOM, and in keeping with the principle that exports will be permitted only to the extent required in order to obtain imports from the Soviet Bloc which are essential to sustain the basic economy and thereby support the defense effort. Exports of these items will not be permitted for the purpose of maintaining or developing export markets in the Soviet Bloc or for similar purposes. Where trade agreements exist governing the exchange of goods between particular countries, exports of these items will not be permitted outside the framework of the trade agreements, except in the case of officially-approved barter or compensation arrangements."

COCOM further agreed that there should be special prior consultation with regard to sales of vessels covered by items 2415 (a) and (b) in all cases where this is not deemed impossible, and Governments were invited to consult with the Committee before permitting the export of other vessels on List II (COCOM Document 565, paragraph 23.).

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2. Control over Sales to Communist China

All vessels on I/L I  
All vessels on I/L II  
All vessels on the CHINCOM supplementary  
China Embargo List.

B. CHARTERING

1. Controls over chartering to European Soviet Bloc

a. COCOM has agreed to the following principles

(a) The objectives of the controls on the sale of vessels should not be frustrated by bare-boat chartering.

(b) Accordingly it is agreed to take such steps as may be possible to prevent the chartering of any embargo type vessels under bare-boat arrangements and of any List II type vessels under such arrangements to an extent which should defeat the List II control on such vessel.

(c) In permitting bare-boat chartering to a Soviet bloc country, Governments should bear in mind that an operation of this nature might have the same disadvantages from the strategic point of view as the sale of a vessel.

b. The CANADIAN delegate made it clear that his Government had no powers to control charters of cargo carrying but he stated that there was no evidence of there being any problem in this respect as far as Canadian ships were concerned. He adopted the resolution on the understanding that his Government could not guarantee to prevent undesirable charters. In view of the explanations given of other countries' control arrangements, however, they would take such measures as were available to them should objectionable bare-boat charters of Canadian ships be proposed or suspected.

2. Controls over chartering to Communist China (and for use in Chinese Waters)

a. The committee noted that, as applied to China, the agreed principles on bare-boat chartering (see page 3 above) would mean that restrictions applied to bare-boat chartering of List I vessels would apply equally to List II vessels.

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b. U.S. proposal pending before COCOM (considerable opposition to the proposals and the views of various participating countries are recorded in COCOM Documents 561 and 712):

Long-term chartering of all vessels on List I and List II to Communist China, or to any Soviet Bloc country for use in Chinese waters, should not be permitted.

C. Repairs and Alterations

Directed against Soviet Bloc including Communist China

1. Use of Controlled Items in Making Repairs and Alterations

a. All repairs or alterations entailing the installation or replacement of any part of equipment included in List I or in the Munitions List should be prohibited.

b. All repairs or alterations entailing the installation or replacement of any part or equipment appearing in List II should be subjected to control and placed to the debit of the repairing country's quota for that article.

c. In any case where paragraph 1 above conflicts with national law or with the requirements of Classification Societies or international treaties, conventions or usage, it is understood that exceptions to the foregoing will be necessary. It is also understood that exceptions may be necessary for the same reasons, in respect of List II items, where the repairing country's quota is insufficient or where the items are under "quid pro quo" rather than "quota" control. Where exceptions are made, the Committee will be informed.

2. Kinds of Repairs and Alterations

a. Any work which would lead to transforming a vessel into one appearing on List I or the Munitions List should be prohibited.

b. Any work which would lead to the adaptation of a merchant vessel so as to fit it for military use should be prohibited. The following are the specific types of such work which have so far been identified (it being understood that other types of work -- particularly any related to new devices--will also be prohibited when identified):

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- (a) Preparatory work for the installation of gun platforms; or the installation thereof;
- (b) Fitting of protective armour or any defensive structures;
- (c) Preparation for the installation of degaussing or demagnetizing equipment.

D. Fitting of Controlled Items into Ships Under Construction

Directed against the Soviet Bloc including Communist China

1. With respect to the construction of ships for the Soviet Bloc and the fitting out of second-hand ships for sale to the Soviet Bloc, member Governments should take such steps as may be necessary to:

- a. Avoid the installation of Munitions List Items
- b. Avoid, to the maximum extent possible, the installation of the following List I items:

- (a) Gyro compasses; gyro repeaters (Item 1485)
- (b) Marine radar (Item 1512)

- c. Substitute, wherever possible, less strategic items in place of the following List I items:

- (a) Diesel engines:

- i. Diesel engines, marine types of 1500 h.p. or over, with rotary speed of 200 r.p.m. or over.

- ii. Diesel engines, all types, with the following characteristics:

- (a) 200 to 300 h.p. with rotary speed of 1,000 r.p.m. or over;
    - (b) 300 to 800 h.p. with rotary speed of 600 r.p.m. or over;
    - (c) Over 800 h.p. with rotary speed of 400 r.p.m. or over.

- (b) Condenser tubes, seamless cupro-nickel. (Item 1250)
  - (c) Water-lubricated bearings (rubber). (Item 1840)

2. The following items are pending in COCOM for additional to the above list:

U.S. proposal for additions to paragraph 2; Doc. 549

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- Item 1210 - searchlight control units
- " 1430 - Cables (multicore) for harbor defense purposes and minesweeping
- 1435 - minesweeping equipment (magnetic and acoustic)
- 1502 - communication equipment of a kind using infra-red radiation or ultrasonic waves; and specialized parts.
- 1510 - location apparatus, underwater apparatus for detecting or locating objects under water (except fish)

U.S. proposal for addition to paragraph 3, Doc. 549

- Item 1375 - air conditioning units, packaged

U.K. proposal for addition to paragraph 3, Doc. 549

- Item 1260 - electric motors, reversible types over 1000 h.p. and automatic controls for starting, stopping and reversing such motors.

\*Recently, some of these items have been agreed for addition to paragraphs 2 and 3 above.

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II. UNITED STATES SHIPPING PROPOSALS REJECTED BY COCOM

(November-December 1951)

A. Controls over Sales to European Soviet Bloc

1. Item 2415 (a) and (b) should be embargoed.
2. Item 2415 (a) should be redefined and special recognition should be made of the military usefulness of vessels in the 4000-7000 GRT range and embargoed if naval experts determine they possess special characteristics of military importance.
3. Item 2405 (icebreakers under 2000 total H.P.) should be embargoed.

B. Controls over Chartering

1. Prohibit chartering of tankers to the Soviet Bloc (COCOM considered that this was not a practical problem).
2. Long-term chartering of all vessels should be controlled so as to prevent frustration of sales controls and to deny the Soviet bloc facilities for the transportation of strategic commodities.

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**III SHIPPING CONTROLS CURRENTLY BEING DISCUSSED IN COCOM/CHINCOM**

China Committee Shipping Discussions are currently focused on voyage licensing and bunkering controls similar to those recently instituted unilaterally by Great Britain.

**A. Voyage Licensing**

Vessels destined for Communist China and/or North Korea must apply for a special license for each such voyage. The necessary license will be granted only on condition that no strategic goods, as listed in the license, will be carried to Communist China and/or North Korea. Exception may be granted in appropriate cases. The list of strategic goods, for the purposes of this licensing system, would be comprised of a simplified version of the United Kingdom Embargo List for China.

**B. Bunkering Controls**

Oil and/or coal bunkers will be refused all vessels engaged in the carriage of strategic cargo to Communist China and/or North Korea.

Responses thus far received from COCOM/CHINCOM members indicate, at least in principle, widespread agreement with such measures. Participating countries are currently exploring appropriate ways and means for the adoption of the necessary implementing legislation. In addition to the United States, which already maintains an embargo over shipments to Communist China and North Korea, and prohibits United States vessels from calling at ports in that area, Canada, France and the Netherlands have announced the imposition of voyage licensing controls, while the other participating countries are expected to follow suit shortly.

With regard to bunkering controls, the United States, Great Britain, and France have agreed to refuse bunkers east of Suez to vessels of any flag carrying strategic goods to Communist China and North Korea. These three countries effectively control most of the free world bunkering stations in the Far East. In addition, United States controls cover return voyages, bunkering, and Great Britain is currently also considering such an extension of existing controls.

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IV. ADDITIONAL CONTROL MEASURES TO BE SUBMITTED TO COCOM/CHINCOM

The United States position with regard to further shipping control measures to be submitted to COCOM/CHINCOM is currently under discussion interdepartmentally. Although no final decisions have as yet been reached, United States proposals are certain to include the following:

A. Control over Sales to European Soviet Bloc

1. Extension of embargo through reduced speed and tonnage specifications.
2. Application of COCOM pre-consultation procedure to wider range of List II vessels.

B. Control over Ship Chartering

1. No charters of any kind to Communist China or for use in trade between the European Communist Bloc and Communist China.
2. No charters of any kind of embargo-type vessels to the Soviet Bloc for use in intra-Soviet bloc trade.
3. No bare-boat chartering of embargo-type vessels to the Soviet Bloc.
4. Tonnage restrictions on other kinds of chartering of embargo-type and List II vessels.
5. Introduction of voyage licensing requirement into chartering contracts.

C. General Repairs on Soviet Bloc Vessels

1. No repairs of Communist Chinese vessels.
2. No repairs other than minimum emergency repairs to embargo-type vessels.
3. Further restrictions on rebuilding or reconditioning of other cargo vessels.

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